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POST-PANEL COMMENTARY
These passages are generated from the commentary that followed each
panel at the symposium. Because these remarks are the product of
transcriptions from audio recordings, we ask that you please excuse any
errors. Some portions have been omitted where the author’s message was
unclear. Any inaudible portions in the commentary that did not detract from
the author’s overall message have been identified accordingly.
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Panel III: Barnette in Modern Context ......................................................866

PANEL I: BARNETTE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Dean Joëlle Moreno, FIU College of Law: Thank you so much, and thank
you so much for staying on time. So, we have now five minutes for the panel
to ask questions or to have a discussion with each other and then we will open
up to questions from the audience.
Prof. Genevieve Lakier, University of Chicago Law School: (Addressing
Professor Brad Snyder) Can I ask you about that? I was actually in Geneva
writing about Frankfurter’s dissent because it is so interesting. So, I agree
with you that the dissent in Barnette—remember, this dissent in Barnette is
part of a long tradition that Frankfurter stole. It is not a departure in any way;
I think it is partially criticized for it. But, it is a representative principle and
view that is not new at all. And, he was a huge admirer of the Lochner dissent
in many ways, more than Holmes took part of when it comes to free-speech,
and Frankfurter in many ways never is. But, there is an incoherency to
Frankfurter’s dissent.
It sounded sort of heroic, right? He is standing tall against the
weaponization of the First Amendment. Frankfurter is not willing to say that
the area of approach applies in every single case. He recognizes that freespeech has this important value. He says that it is not as if all means of access
to the political process he proposed to the Jehovah’s Witnesses minimizes
the intrusion of First Amendment rights. He says [Jehovah’s Witnesses] are
justified in the flag salute, and they can still go to Congress and protest. He
also said that it is not as if this was motivated by discrimination. It would be
one thing if the legislature did it because it hates Jehovah’s Witnesses. It is
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another thing when it does it to promote national [inaudible]. First of all, my
question is, is that consistent with [inaudible] here? It does not seem like it.
So, if we are going to have that wedge, then why is the Frankfurter approach
any less perceptible to weaponization in some ways?
Second, given the facts of the case, I would respect Frankfurter’s
commitment, but it just seems that its application is really ridiculous.
Obviously, these rules were motivated by animus towards Jehovah’s
Witnesses. I do not understand how he could be insensible to that fact or
denying it. So, it seems like a major problem, in his dissent, that he is refusing
to acknowledge it or that he recognizes that it would blow up his conclusion,
but he is not willing to go there.
Prof. Brad Snyder, Georgetown University Law Center: Well, there was
a lot there. So, let me try to take it apart. Frankfurter, I think, is on the
forefront of introducing a balancing approach to the First Amendment. I think
we often may not agree with the way that Frankfurter balances First
Amendment rights and the rights of religious minorities in this case or in
Dennis, where I think this balancing approach is on full display.
I think he thinks that the majority has gone too far, and he hated the law.
He is not in sympathy with the law. I do not think the point of the law is to
hurt Jehovah’s Witnesses. The flag salute law is not like, “Let’s get the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and have us flag salute.”
I do think there is this sort of jingoism and national unity around World
War II. I think the failure to give an exception to the Jehovah’s Witnesses is
unconscionable, and, of course, there should have been an exception for the
Jehovah’s Witnesses. But, the law, the idea of a “flag-saluter,” or just saying
the Pledge of Allegiance—it is hard to ascribe that to intend to a particular
religious group. That, to me, is a little bit of a leap. But, let me respond to a
brief of the panels, to let them chime in; I know our time is fleeting.
I think there is some danger to Justice Jackson’s broad language, and
that is part of what Frankfurter is reacting to. Jackson is such a great writer,
like Brandeis, Holmes, and Marshall. He is in that category. I think that
sometimes the loftiness of Jackson’s language was too broad, and I agree
with you, that it is a free-speech, appellate speech case.
Frankfurter wrote a Columbia law review essay about Jackson, who is
his closest friend on the Court, which said that Jackson, later on in his life,
realized that his broad language sometimes masked some problems and
complexities with what was going on. But, as to John’s paper, one thing I
wanted to ask him was whether our doctrinal confusion actually starts with
Barnette?
Because Barnette lists so many rights, it does not articulate in a real
theorized way what it is doing. It reads more like an essay, whether our
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doctrinal confusion ends there. And, my last comment to Ron—you
mentioned at the end of your talk, Ron, about the ABA Civil Rights
Committee’s amicus brief. Well, that was written by Louis Lusky, the author
of footnote four, right? He wrote that brief, and that committee was chaired
by Grenville Clark. Monte Lemann was on that committee, and Zechariah
Chafee was on that committee. I wonder whether that amicus brief, years
before the course of amicus jurisprudence was really driving a lot of the
Court’s decisions, was doing the work in changing from Gobitis to Barnette,
from free exercise to compelled speech, and whether we ought to credit
Hayden Covington, or whether we ought to credit Louis Lusky and those
lawyers.
Prof. Ronald K.L. Collins, University of Washington School of Law:
Well, Covington just echoed their arguments in this point making the paper,
just a couple of big comments, Genevieve.
We talk about the judges and their role in the regulatory state.
Remember that these cases were brought to them by progressive lawyers, so
you might want to give some attention to progressive lawyers, like
[inaudible] Francis, Zechariah Chafee, and very importantly, Osmond
Fraenkel, with the American Civil Liberties Union.
On your note you talked about, and I love this idea, revisiting and
rethinking Frankfurter’s opinions in Gobitis and Barnette. The picture of him
was almost demonic, and I am not saying that there is not some truth there. I
would not use the word demonic, but about.
But, I think it is important to be judicious and revisit it. I just mentioned
probably something you already know. We mentioned the Atkins case, and
the incredible work that he did as a lawyer, working with Louis Brandeis,
Florence Kelley, and Josephine, the women who really wrote the Brandeis
brief or most of it. And then he worked with them again in Atkins, and their
role in developing the law.
Finally, just one last thing, you all know the name Thurgood Marshall.
How many of you know the name of Robert L. Carter? You know the doctrine
of freedom of association. The Constitution says “freedom of assembly.”
There was a guy who was a graduate of Howard College and then went
to Columbia and wrote an L.L.M. on freedom of association and the First
Amendment. His name was Robert L. Carter. He was one of the lawyers for
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.
In the case NAACP v. Alabama,1 that is his case. That is where it began.
It began with progressive lawyers arguing on behalf of progressive causes,

1

357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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and we see what has happen to that. It is one of those cases that is sometimes
used as court weaponization of the First Amendment.
Prof. John Inazu, Washington University School of Law: Did the
confusion start with Barnette? No. I am just kidding. I think that some of the
labor cases in the 20s and 30s suggest that there are lots of cases, at the time,
that are raising different, multiple claims, and addressing it in the same kind
of flowery language. So, you are right, that Barnette is probably a symptom,
but I would not place the blame on Barnette. I think, actually, there is some
important transitional work that cases like Widmar and Good News really
bring all together.
Dean Joëlle Moreno, FIU College of Law: Okay, questions from the
audience?
Prof. Steven Smith, University of San Diego School of Law: This is a
question mostly for Genevieve. I thought your presentation was really
interesting, and it seemed to me like you were very persuasive in suggesting
that there is a big difference between what is at stake in Barnette, and what
is at stake in issues involving disclosure.
Saying compelled affirmation of beliefs that a speaker does not share, is
just not the same at all. It seems like disclosing information that they might
prefer not to disclose, but it does not involve that. Is it the same, though? You
seem to be suggesting that that is almost the same distinction as between
opinion and fact.
It strikes me that that is not the same distinction at all, and I would be
much more worried about inquisition if you did not insist on equating them
because that seems to me like a pretty dangerous distinction that could create
severe inroads into what is the core of the Barnette principle.
Prof. Genevieve Lakier, University of Chicago Law School: I am actually
curious why you think it is not a distinction because, of course, some
disclosures are really problematic.
I am teaching freedom of speech this quarter, and I just taught American
Communication Association v. Douds,2 which is not a case that is in most
casebooks, but I think it is really important for students to see the 1950s cases.
This is the case, of course, where the Court upholds the loyal communist oath
law that is part of the Taft-Hartley Act that requires unions to disclose that
they are part of the communist party and that they have particular beliefs, and
this is a really problematic law because it requires them to disclose opinions,
2

339 U.S. 382 (1950).
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because it penalizes them by denying them the [inaudible] based on their
viewpoint. So, [inaudible] are not all the same either. I guess my intuitions
are actually that opinion and fact is a much better basis of distinction than the
disclosure versus compelled belief. But, tell me why you think it is so
dangerous to say Barnette is only a case about opinion, not a case about fact.
Prof. Steven Smith, University of San Diego School of Law: Well, this is
probably an almost absurd example; it only comes to mind at the moment
because I was having a discussion with John Inazu last night about Kyrie
Irving’s views about whether the Earth was flat or not. Apparently, at one
point, [Kyrie] said that he believed the Earth was flat, or recently, I think
John says he has recanted.
So, suppose, though, that you have—I was going to say that is almost a
frivolous example—but, you can think of all kinds of examples where people
do not believe certain things that other people would regard as matters of fact.
And, to force them to affirm those things, it seems to me, would be just as
severe as a sort of violation of their integrity in the Barnette sense. It is totally
a matter of opinion.
Prof. Genevieve Lakier, University of Chicago Law School: But, now you
are talking about compelled belief, because the reason it is so severe is
because they do not believe that.
Prof. Steven Smith, University of San Diego School of Law: Right,
exactly.
Prof. Genevieve Lakier, University of Chicago Law School: So, again,
now we are talking about how we all get on the case, and all of a sudden,
nice, clear distinctions that we draw for purposes of 50-minute talks get very
messy. I completely agree that the distinction between opinion and fact can
be a complicated one.
But, your opinion again suggests that that problem is compelled
affirmation of belief. The problem with that, and the reason why it feels like
such an intrusion on their freedom, is because they are being required to
speak something that they do not believe is true. This seems to be very
different, just to use a counterexample, in the last term’s case, the National
Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,3 the Pregnancy Crisis Center
case.
In that case, the Court says these pregnancy clinics cannot be required
to disclose that the State of California provides low cost or no cost medical
3

138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
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care including abortion, in part, and this violates their right not to speak
because it is a fact, but it is a controversial fact.
And, the Court does not mean controversial to say that we are not sure
it is actually a fact, which is how the Court previously used it on this opinion,
this fact line. But, it is about controversial things and you should not be
required to say things. So that just seems wrong. It seems like a very different
kind of problem than the person being compelled to say something they do
not believe.
Prof. Ronald K.L. Collins, University of Washington School of Law: If I
can weigh in. There is a case that is being argued by Paul Smith and faculty
right now challenging the constitutionality of a Maryland statute that has
disclosure requirements for political advertisements, and it is being imposed
on newspapers online. And the issue in the case is the distinction between
compelled exposure and compelled expression. That case is being litigated
right now in a district court in Maryland.
So again, just another example of not only leaning toward the Supreme
Court cases, but it has actually happened. In about three or four years, this
will work its way through the legal academy. I mean not from here to you but
just generally as they would have to go to appellate court. It is a phenomenal
case—different standards of review, and depending on how you pigeonhole
it, it is actually a state law directed against political expression. And it is
being challenged right now in federal district court in Maryland.
Roberto Lopez, 3L FIU College of Law: This question is for any of the
panelists. Considering how Barnette has been expanded beyond just
compulsion of opinion—you decide to demand Internet companies to
disclose algorithms or whatever programs are being used to disseminate
opinions that are not popular, but become popular because people see
comments that are made by bots rather than by people.
Prof. Genevieve Lakier, University of Chicago Law School: Great, so can
the government compel Internet companies to disclose their algorithms?
Roberto Lopez, 3L FIU College of Law: Yeah. Operators, owners, bots, or
fake comments that are being used to disseminate ideas that are not actually
popular.
Prof. Genevieve Lakier, University of Chicago Law School: So, I think
there are probably a lot of other reasons why you might have problems with
the government compelling a company to disclose their algoriths.
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My relatively narrow view of Barnette does make me think—there is
this case in the Southern District of New York they do in which it is a Internet
search engine that systematically excludes democracy-promoting sites from
its search results. It is complicated procedural posture because it is in China
but the litigants basically say, if you have a First Amendment right to, or that
our equal protection rights are being violated by being systematically
censored by this private search engine. But that is on and on with the Chinese
government that is [inaudible].
And the search engine company says they a right from Barnette to
completely control what they do or do not include. They cannot be forced to
include search results that they do not like in their search engine. So, I think
that that is wrong. I think that that is an over-reading of Barnette. It does
seem like trade secrets who would want to require search engines to disclose
their algorithms. But yes, in general, I think that there is a space for a lot more
regulation of that.
Prof. Ronald K.L. Collins, University of Washington School of Law:
There is a new book called Robotica: Speech Rights and Artificial
Intelligence4 that speaks to some of these issues.
Roberto Lopez, 3L FIU College of Law: Thank you.
Prof. Aaron Saiger, Fordham University School of Law: This is also a
question for Genevieve. You said you were talking about a disclosure case
about how much money actually goes to charity versus not, that one of the
problems was that maybe we should look at whether compelling speech
actually threatens free-speech values. And so that led me to ask, I think
maybe this is a question of level of generality as is so often the case in the
constitutional law.
The question is how we pitch the claim, right? So, if we are saying, well,
if there is a law out there that is requiring someone to say or disclose
something, I might think that the threshold, is that there is a free-speech value
at least presumptively there. The law is requiring you to say or disclose
something.
Or, if you said that the level of generality was requiring to disclose a
fact, that is a little narrower, the law is requiring you to disclose a percentage
of money that you raise that you turn over to charity. Or, to now build on
[inaudible] analysis, requiring you to disclose what percentage of money

4
RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, ROBOTICA: SPEECH RIGHTS AND ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE (2018).
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turned over to a charity in a setting in which some unpopular charities might
be harmed.
Now, that clearly mattered to them, I think, going back to NAACP. Part
of the concern here was that unpopular charities would be harmed by this.
That is the harm that I think we have to take into account when thinking about
the regulation of speech. So, the question is where do we think about the freespeech value? If we think about it at the most general level, the most specific
level does not matter in how the jurisprudence gets developed.
Prof. Genevieve Lakier, University of Chicago Law School: I agree with
you that there are free-speech interests implicated, because I think it is just at
the end.
I do not necessarily think that laws that require people to disclose
information or to speak things that affect, pose no First Amendment harms.
But they do not necessarily pose the kind of comment that requires strict
scrutiny. I guess in general, I think, some kind of intermediate scrutiny. And
I would say that the analogy, the useful analogy, is to incidental regulation of
speech. But I do not want to say that, because I do not like O’Brien because
it is too low. So, you know that criticism. But in general, just as a theory, the
useful, and the New Deal regulations [inaudible] in Associated Press, the
case that I cited, it really treats the Sherman Act as an incidental regulation
of speech.
So, what is so useful about that whole line of cases is that that in general,
the Court provides relatively deferential scrutiny because it recognizes that
the government had a lot of good reasons to do what it was doing even if it
has an effect on speech. When the burden is very severe as in NAACP v.
Alabama, which the Court recognizes was not intended to suppress
expression, is an incidental regulation of speech, but in this particular context,
has profound and severe burdens on the groups that are regulated by it
because of a historical circumstance.
In that case, then all of a sudden we get much more scrutiny. I like that
framework. I think it is supple and then responsive to the particular context
and circumstance. Of course, we do not want the government to effectively
prevent you from speaking. But that is very different than making, what the
Court tends to do in its cases these days, making a sort of a metaphysical
claim, that any time the government compels speech, we have to apply strict
scrutiny.
Prof. Ronald K.L. Collins, University of Washington School of Law:
These questions, I think, raise another question: how do progressive values
evolve into conservative norms, and does the counter ever hold true?
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Prof. Genevieve Lakier, University of Chicago Law School: In a way, isn’t
that what we have been saying, no?
Prof. Ronald K.L. Collins, University of Washington School of Law:
Still, what happens typically in these sorts of situations, is conservatives will
go back to a case and say, well, that is really not the case. And sometimes
they breathe new life into it, and what have you. And that may or may not be
the case, but I just worry and wondering stood back and [inaudible] he just
thought, well, how does this happen?
I mean, how do cases like NAACP or etc. How is it that one value, if you
will, evolves into a, if you will, a counter to that, and I hadn’t thought about
it until today. Does the converse hold true? Are there conservative norms that
evolve into progressive values?
PANEL II: READING BARNETTE
Prof. Ronald K.L. Collins, University of Washington School of Law:
(Addressing Prof. Paul Horwitz) I wanted to thank you for your emphasis on
that incredible article, and I strongly recommend it. It’s a collection of essays
that evoke on First Amendment cases, the law review might give some
thought to ask them to write a forward or to adapt portions of that for the law
review Symposium.
The idea of careful writing, which now in an era of corporate writing
(collective writing done largely by [inaudible]) got me to thinking that
Brandeis certainly attended to detail, and to say that he overlooked this, and
he overlooked that, and what have you, he was also, like Holmes, very
attempted to be courts of the aesthetic, of the power of phrases, uninhibited,
robust, wide-open marketplaces like his, that others use.
And so, it just occurred to me that he may well have thought that a
pound, if you will, of important rhetoric could very much overshadow, even
for decades, any analytical problems that might, and I don’t know that he
might have been insensitive to the concerns of progressives and, if you will,
all of the authorization of the First Amendment. But he may not have wanted
to deal with them. Instead, he placed it with some pretty powerful rhetoric,
which, like [inaudible], carried the day.
Prof. Paul Horwitz, University of Alabama School of Law: A classic
example of this is the opinion for the Court of Chief Justice Warren in Brown
v. Board of Education,5 which Warren wrote for the public. He designedly
wanted it to be the kind of thing that could and would be reprinted in
5

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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newspapers across the country and read by the American people. And of
course, it left the remedial phase until later, and it left many problems until
later. It is possible, and one wants to talk carefully to one’s students about
this, it’s possible both to praise Brown, and then to spend time questioning,
picking apart the opinion, right?
It is great. It is not necessarily great law or a kind of formal legal
doctrine. Now, one can say this, I think, about Barnette. I guess what I’d say
is, and I appreciate this from our Canadian perspective, but early in the
development of individual rights and individual rights jurisprudence, there is
a greater need for setting the stage, and for saying in an important way that
we’re going to value individual rights or treat you in a particular way.
And then it is necessary because people have to plan, rely on decisions
and so on, to come up, and because lower courts have to apply them. It’s
necessary to doctrinalize these things, right? So yeah, we get uglier, more
corporate doctrine. It serves a real value. We could simply reject it. We
should then, though, recognize that we are taken back from time to time to
the first questions.
Brian Heckmann, 2L FIU College of Law: My question is for Professors
Saiger and Smith, and Professor Horwitz, I welcome your insight as well.
It’s just that the question is posed through the papers that the other
colleagues on the panel addressed. Professor Xavier, you mentioned that
Barnette is more about schools, or that’s the primary focus, and Professor
Smith, you talk about how there’s a fundamental pluralism aspect of it, and
I’m in my mind sort of combining the two and looking at how that’s an
increasingly rare occurrence as we become a more polarized society.
Pluralism in whatever microcosms, be them the schools, be them social
organizations, is becoming rarer and rarer. You’re seeing individuals who are
concerned that, to use one of the quotes that Professor Saiger said, “rather
than having public schools create Americans out of kids, they’re creating
partisans out of kids, creating Democrats, or creating Republicans, based on
whatever administration is currently in power, or whatever cause célèbre is
currently in vogue.
So my question deals with Professor Saiger’s idea that the line has to be
drawn somewhere. That Barnette does not stand for the proposition that
public schools cannot ever compel speech, and Professor Smith’s concept of
the neutrality interpretation of Barnette. Is the appropriate way to draw the
line, and would drawing the line in this way, make the neutrality
interpretation a viable option that could actually be implemented?
Should we cognitively disassociate our schools from the state, from
whatever politics that is going on, and really make control of the academic
pursuit localized, so that you still have students who can be compelled to stop
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saying two plus two equals five, but will not have students who are
disciplined for either insisting that there are only two genders, or insisting
that climate change is a man-made problem?
Prof. Aaron Saiger, Fordham University School of Law: I think that
Professor Smith and I would agree that one of the genius moves of Barnette
is to begin with a general principle about citizens and compelled speech and
then to treat schools as a special case. It has to treat schools as a special case
for the reasons that I articulate. But I am not sure that one ought to treat what
public school teachers and officials can do as anything except for the fact that
they are a very unusual kind of public official.
The other groups in those categories, or the other places of compelled
attendance, have speech. The Armed Forces and courtrooms are the two that
come immediately to mind. I do not think I said that students are being sorted
by political party, and I guess I would respond to what you said about schools
in two ways.
One is that the state cannot dissociate itself from an educational
enterprise, just as imaginary Senator Smith cannot dissociate himself from
the hearings, but whatever you decide is a political decision. And the other is
that localism is no longer the only kind of associational structure available to
us that is not big government control because now they are capable of sorting
people by virtually any criterion that we want. So, the attractions of globalism
should be balanced against those possibilities as well.
Prof. Steven Smith, University of San Diego School of Law: Well, I do not
know if I would have much to add of substance. It seems to me, the gist of
your question was, could we avoid some of these problems that arise, trying
to figure out how our next principles might apply to schools if we just got the
government out of the business of schooling.
Now, if we made them more privatized and so forth. I think you can.
You can reduce or avoid some pressures in that way. You can give people
more choices, but even though that is a choice, you could make that choice
partly so that there would be more latitude for students to be able to test
schools where you would not be required to affirm things they did not
believe, and so forth.
I cannot imagine that will be any sort of overall cure. There is always
going to be hard problems like that, I think. I do not think that public school
tradition is going to go away. Frankly, I mean, I can’t imagine another. You
could have an array of schools so that every student would be able to find
this. So, I think these are going to be hard issues, though you can maybe
address to some degree some of these problems.
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Prof. Genevieve Lakier, University of Chicago Law School: I think this is
a question for all three of you, but I am going to tie in with Aaron. I want to
get your provocation I think at the end of your talk, when you said maybe
Barnette is wrong because we shouldn’t constitutionalize progressive
education, or maybe Barnette is right because we should constitutionalize
progressive education?
That was a clever trick; you’re giving us one or the other. I want to say
Door C. So maybe Barnette is right, but not because it requires us to
constitutionalize progressive education, but because the lower issue of
Barnette poses a substantial burden to the ability of a minority group to
participate in public life, and support in the domain of public life.
Maybe Barnette can be a win, as my colleague’s decision, that it doesn’t
require us to constitutionalize a particular vision of education but prohibits
the government from imposing a particularly severe burden on any particular
group. And I was tracking all three, I thought all three papers were really
interesting and incisive analyses of Barnette, but in none of them, other than
Professor Horowitz’s, which talked a little bit about equality but quickly
moved away, was a view that maybe what the vision of Barnette is a vision
of equality.
So not all three sort-of presumed a kind of neutral principle that applies
to all groups different at the same. Either all groups have a right of integrity,
or all groups have a right against non-neutral state action, or all groups have
a right to progressive education or not progressive education. Maybe this is
a principle about the different ways in which the Constitution applies to
different groups depending upon their different positions and their burdens
that facially neutral laws that perhaps can impose.
Prof. Steven Smith, University of San Diego School of Law: Well I would
resist that interpretation of Barnette. I think, as Paul pointed out, that that
would possibly be a way to write Barnette, and I think it seems the Court
chose not to write it that way.
I am very thankful they did not choose to write it that way, because I
think that the principles that it is written from are very important ones, as
opposed to because Jehovah Witnesses were a minority, that is why the case
went that way. But it seems to me that almost, by definition, any student who
came into conflict with something, the school would be requiring them to
affirm would be that sense of minority.
I become worried about efforts to decide who is a minority, and who is
not a minority, and so just given one instance of it, in the kind of work I do,
at conferences I go to I hear quite often it said that someone, like say Jack
Phillips, the baker in the Masterpiece Cakeshop case, we do not need to worry
about him, because he is a Christian, and Christians are not a minority,

2019]

Post-Panel Commentary

865

Christians are the majority in this country. And to me, that seems
sociologically so, almost naive. Christianity is not like a block of people, you
know? To someone like Jack Phillips I think he is just really clearly part of a
minority, but I do not think anything is really gained by trying to sort things
out in that way.
Prof. Paul Horwitz, University of Alabama School of Law: I guess first of
all, yes, doctrinally, I think the thing that people often point to about Barnette
that it is important for turning to speech and kind of advancing this vision,
rather than creating it as a freedom of religion case, is the same thing that
makes me think it is not an equality argument, and that it could have gone
that way. As I say, in the facts, there was a willingness to accommodate some
others—a majority group for what it’s worth—and not the Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and they could have decided it, in theory. on those grounds, and
they didn’t. I guess I would say this, it’s true certainly that my general
position on these matters tends to not be in entirely on board with modern
progressive readings of the First Amendment or particular kinds of reading
the First Amendment.
But I take them seriously. I think that there is, as I said, a lot of traction
behind some of these ideas and that they have a lot of value. Or I could
disagree with them and yet find they are worth exploring, as opposed to kind
of being the subject of partisan dismissal, but I think that then they have to
grapple with this. You would have to grapple with Barnette as it is.
I mean, I think one could come up with an equality reading and say
Barnette would have been better done that way, but I do not think that is the
Barnette we have. I read a paper this summer, a very good paper, on
compelled speech and religion, that talked about Barnette, and the
ambivalence was palpable.
The paper kind of struggled to deny what I think the rest of the argument
of the paper suggested, which was that the author was not really happy with
Barnette, and would, on the whole, like to see it go because the author wanted
more room for compelled speech, or for government action in this area,
especially in the public accommodations field.
The author again, to kind of keep it neutral, the author knew that
Barnette was an issue at the background, raised it with integrity, but was
uncomfortable finally grappling with it. And I guess what I would say is that
just as I have a more or less traditional or civil [inaudible], really need to take
on board the important new arguments that are being made in the field.
So, I think it is fair to say that some of those arguments have to grapple
with Barnette, again, as it exists. So, they might decide that they are actually
more sympathetic to Frankfurter’s dissent than the majority, and that is fine.
But, I think it would be interesting to join that debate.
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Prof. Aaron Saiger, Fordham University School of Law: I do not know if
this is fully responsive, but the music that I hear in Barnette is, we shall not
strangle the free mind at its source. And that way of thinking about the
problem of the students is the opposite, I think, of thinking about them as a
discrete minority. They are each a free mind as all students shall be, and
particularly because I suspect, although I do not know, that it’s
counterfactual.
In general, the children black out that they were witnesses and are not
always independent believers. They’ve been pushed by their families, but for
the Court to say these are free minds says to me that they really were not
thinking about minorities. That is the way I read the case, and its pedagogy,
and that is also the way I read the historical dispute at the time, in educational
circles, which was essentially why I am trying to create patriots out of
everyone.
PANEL III: BARNETTE IN MODERN CONTEXT
Prof. Howard M. Wasserman, FIU College of Law: Thank you, Professor
Kendrick and to all of our panelists. The panelists agreed to do something a
little different because there are two free speech pieces to Barnette. One is
the question of compelled expression, and the other is the role and use of the
American flag and American-flag-related ceremonies as a part of the First
Amendment.
If we are thinking about other current controversies that potentially
implicate Barnette, one of them is NFL players kneeling during the National
Anthem. It also happens, in addition to being the 75th anniversary of
Barnette, it is the 50th anniversary of Tommie Smith and John Carlos raising
their fists during the medal ceremony at the Summer Olympics.
We have not talked about the NFL problem in Barnette in First
Amendment terms because the NFL is a private actor. There are some state
action arguments, but I do not think they actually would work. Therefore, it
is being litigated in other terms. But, if we assume that we could get state
action, then we get into another issue, which is that the NFL players are
employees of their teams and of the NFL, and the First Amendment rights of
employees are significantly less than the First Amendment rights of ordinary
citizens.
What would happen if a government office, say the DMV office,
decided that it was going to start each day by having all the employees stand
at attention, recite the Pledge of Allegiance, and sing God Bless America.
The employer proffers that they are doing this to remind the employees of
their obligation as public servants to serve the people and work for the people
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who come to the office. Could an employee take a knee or opt out of that
ceremony, and could the employee be sanctioned for that?
Prof. Leslie Kendrick, University of Virginia School of Law: If you were
to ask people, is there no problem in saying it is part of your duty to sign a
test oath or it is part of your job duty to aver that you are not a member of the
communist party.
I think the question is just a lot easier, and it points out a kind of loophole
in our society. It is not just about compelled speech, it is about the restriction
of speech as well. How much does Garcetti allow employers to engage in
gaming to say, whatever it is that I want you to do or I do not want you to do,
or I am just going to define your job duties to include either that you must do
that thing or you cannot do that thing.
If you are concerned about whistleblowers, you could say, well, okay so
whistleblowing is part of your job duties, and we are going to tell you when
you can do that, and the answer is never. Now we will no longer engage in
whistleblowing, right? Because now that has been subsumed in part of your
job duties. I think the Court is somewhat concerned about this in Garcetti,
but they do not get too far in figuring out how to deal with it. And I think of
this hypothetical as just a version of that.
Prof. Abner S. Greene, Fordham University School of Law: I had a
similar reaction to the hypothetical. Yesterday I was thinking about the
loyalty oath cases, and I mean to some extent a lot of this can be recapitulated
in the very difficult category of constitutional conditions, or unconstitutional
conditions.
As you may know, there is no overarching doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. Sometimes conditions are constitutional, and sometimes they are
not, and it varies; it is very hard. But I think that the test of loyalty-oath-type
cases are a very good example of where the government, you know you do
not have to get me hired as a public school teacher, you do not have a right
to be a public school teacher, but the government can condition you to be a
public school teacher on taking a loyalty oath.
So, I would take this as the thing; you do not have a right to work at the
DMV, but the government may not condition your work with the DMV on
saying the Pledge. On the football player situation, I am very troubled by
what the NFL owners have done. Not of the exact state of play, they have
backed down a little bit. ESPN has backed down, and it has changed a lot.
I am a sort of left of center person generally, but I have very moderate
tendencies and try to see if everyone can just get along, which is increasingly
hard. I wonder whether all of the players who really want to push the taking
a knee to express support for Black Lives Matter, more generally for

868

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 13:853

protesting violent, illegal police conduct, could use their very public national
platform in just a different way.
That is, I think the taking has obscured the message, and maybe it should
not be obscured, maybe people should understand that, that people get
confused. And so, I just feel, this is just a political point, but I wonder whether
this very powerful group of impressive, well-paid players, who are on TV a
lot, could use that to make the same argument without making people
distracted about it being about the flag in America.
Prof. Erica Goldberg, University of Dayton School of Law: My general
tendency in approaching legal questions is turn easy questions into hard
questions. So, I actually think there is something to this as a difficult question.
If any speech pursuant to your official duties is employee speech entitled to
no protection, I think there has to be some way of defining what speech is
pursuant to your official duties.
We might just end up falling back on something like Pickering. Are the
people refusing to stand, you know, as sort of ordinary citizens, or does this
actually implicate the functions of their job? I can see some government
offices where they could say they could make at least a passable argument
that it implicates the functions of their job. I think there are certain
government offices where you just have to say no, this is sort of within our
purview as a normal citizen, and then you are going to need some compelling
reason to force us to say the Pledge. In terms of the NFL, no, I certainly as a
expansive First Amendment person, even though it’s not state action, I am
very heartened by the protests; I think they are wonderful.
But I do think it is a good illustration of the difference between state
actors and non-state actors, because we have a variety of teams pursuing a
variety of approaches, whether or not they let their players protest. There is
some sort of competition among teams to appeal to players, to appeal to the
audience, and that sort of competition is what separates the state actors from
private actors. That is why we do not force private actors to comply with the
First Amendment.
Prof. Howard M. Wasserman, FIU College of Law: The microphone is
circulating in order for panelists to receive questions.
Roberto Lopez, 3L FIU College of Law: This is a question for everyone.
With the Masterpiece Cakeshop case, I wonder how much guidance we can
get from Scalia’s opinion in the Smith case with their peyote scenario and
adopting that from a criminal context to a civil, which would just then make
us ask the question, how much artistic expression is regulated by the
government? As a group concept, it seemed like the Barnette opinion gives
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very narrow and visual products or an extremely expansive product at this
point.
Prof. Abner S. Greene, Fordham University School of Law: I hope this is
purely doctrinal. If Jack Phillips had just raised his claim as a free exercise
exemptions claim under the First Amendment, we know that under Smith he
would lose. That is why almost the entire case was litigated as a compelled
expression case, although Kennedy found a way to make it ends with
religious.
I think the best way of seeing the nature of Jack Phillip’s expression
plan, is as a request for an exemption from the state public accommodations
law. I actually think that is the best way of understanding O’Brien’s claim in
O’Brien as a claim for an exemption from the draft, putting aside the prior
argument that Congress was acting with discriminatory intent.
I think if we see the O’Brien type case and the Phillips type case as
claims for exemptions from generally applicable laws affecting speech, and
if we were to apply true intermediate scrutiny, we would be at the right spot.
That leaves the puzzle of why we would have true intermediate scrutiny for
exemptions claim in the speech setting and only rational basis scrutiny for
the religious setting, which is a question that people should keep pondering
because it is hard to know the answer to.
Prof. Leslie Kendrick, University of Virginia School of Law: I look at
O’Brien, and I look at the way that the Supreme Court in particular has done
O’Brien. I do not think it is actually intermediate scrutiny. I think it is
essentially rational basis, which helps to resolve any type of tension between
it and Smith, but I think, certainly lower courts have used it to be more
protective, and the Supreme Court has at times too.
This question raises the fact that there is a lot of disagreement about
what to do about neutral and general applicable laws, and you have Smith in
the religion context, but Smith is highly contested, and of course in Phillips
one of his arguments was overrule Smith. On the speech side, when it comes
to restrictions, you have something that looks more like Smith.
This is why it matters that I think O’Brien is fairly rational basis, that
you are going to have heightened scrutiny for content-based laws, and you
are going to have much more permissive scrutiny for content-neutral laws.
When it comes to speech compulsions, we do not have that framework. We
have the mess that Barnette and its progeny has generated, which seems to
be less about purpose and more about effects.
That works quite different. That is why Phillips would like to overrule
Smith and replace it with something that looks more effect space, more like
the Barnette progeny compelled speech cases. It is a strange thing that we
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have the asymmetry that we do with regard to speech on one hand, and
religion on the other, and whether we get more that looks Barnette or more
that looks like Smith, it looks like we are headed more this direction right
now.
Prof. Howard M. Wasserman, FIU College of Law: One other
consideration is that RFRA statute kind of really fouled things up, because
then it goes from religion goes from rational basis to strict scrutiny. Phillips
has just picked the wrong state to live in because Colorado does not have a
RFRA statute.
Prof. Paul Horwitz, University of Alabama School of Law: A question for
Professor Kendrick. I agree with you that if dignitary harm is kind of treated
as mere offensiveness, that is a problem.
I guess I am wondering two things. Are those the only two choices:
dignitary harm or mere offensiveness, and how many cases will involve only
that as opposed to some panoply of harms, among them dignitary harm?
Second, if it is a pure dignitary harm instance, then what is your sense about
how we should treat that doctrinally? Should that be a Trump and no thirdparty harm sense, or are we better off if it is a pure dignitary harms, subjecting
it to balancing? How would you address that?
Prof. Leslie Kendrick, University of Virginia School of Law: I do not
know. I hesitated to raise the issue of dignitary harms because I am not a
theorist of dignitary harms. I am not someone who spent a lot of time
doctrinally working through that, and I did it partly because I know there are
people here who have thought about that.
I’m interested in learning some more about dignitary harms. My general
response, my intuition regarding these arguments is to separate the economic
harm and the dignitary harm and try to disaggregate the various types of
harms that go along when someone is denying service on the basis of a
protected characteristic. My own impulse is to think it is very hard to
disaggregate those harms.
The economic part of it is part, and the dignitary part is part. However,
I do not know that you can just pull them apart, such that when you send
someone away, as people did in the South prior to the Civil Rights Act, that
action is conveying the idea that you are being sent away because of your
race.
Even if you could find a place down the street that will serve you, on the
margins, an economic debt has been imposed on you. Certainly a dignitary
harm has been imposed on you. I have a hard time pulling those things apart
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in quite as clinical a way as some folks do. But I need to think about it a lot
more, and I appreciate your question.
Prof. Genevieve Lakier, University of Chicago Law School: I was
interested in the idea that we should recognize a lot of things as expressive
conduct or speech. Relatedly, we should recognize that it depends on the
harms and claims, and that there should still be some kind of limit.
Prof. Genevieve Lakier, University of Chicago Law School: I’m curious
about how broad or narrow you define this category of the conduct to which
the business engages in, because I am interested in this as well. It seems to
me that the complicated thing about the anti-discrimination laws often in the
conversation is that, I feel we are misidentifying where the expression occurs.
So much debate surrounding Masterpiece Cakeshop is whether the cake
itself is expressive conduct. The debate centered around whether it was blank
cake, not a blank cake, a made-to-order cake, or a cake on the shelf. This
seems like a crazy way to define doctrine. It seems like the expression that is
really being targeted is the act of providing service to a member of a targeted
class, because in the act of providing service, you’re saying, “I recognize you
as a member of the public, and I’m going to treat you like every other member
of the public.”
It doesn’t seem to me so much about the cake, just like in the 60s the act
of refusing service at lunch counters was a profoundly expressive act.
However, no one was saying a hamburger had debates about whether or not
it was a hamburger or not. I don’t think that the point was the hamburger was
expressive, it’s the act of saying, “I will treat you as a member of the general
public who I will patronize,” and that, in our commercial society, has a
certain kind of status if you’re willing to be of service. Think about the status
harms that were done to the African-Americans that had to go to the back
door of these special establishments rather than the front door, and it was all
about the division of service.
So, we think of the expression surrounding the action is not the cake but
is the act of giving service, then you have an extremely expansive conception,
which I think is correct, that the anti-discrimination laws are laws about
expression. And they are justified, because the harms that they are seeking to
prevent are very, very serious which I’m okay with. I think Jackson would
also be okay, because he recognized the clear and present danger. They also
might be able to justify this.
Prof. Abner S. Greene, Fordham University School of Law: Here are my
initial thoughts, which would have to be worked out. First, I don’t have a
fully worked out view about this, but I do think that, for Jack Phillips, if I
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have it right, for him, custom made wedding cakes are a type of a craft; a type
of an art, and the act of creating the cake is the expression. It’s really the act
of using his hands to make the cake.
Then I have an argument about expression associations. My second point
is the larger claim about how we might have a too expansive conception about
what sort of conduct is expressive conduct. I want to be a little bit of a
formalist here and stick with the sort of two-part test that I know from Texas
v. Johnson6 that goes back to Spence and other cases: does the person
subjectively believe that she’s expressing a message, and would the
reasonable viewers see it as expressing a message.
In some settings that works, but I think in other settings it doesn’t. I had
a student who came to me to write a paper recently about a case from Florida
about sharing food in a public park. The decision says that this act of food
sharing qualifies at the threshold as expressive conduct. That doesn’t seem
right to me as a general matter. I don’t know the specific facts of this case,
but as a general matter, it seems to me that if you are in the business of
providing a soup kitchen or something similar, there may be a, what I would
call, an internal and external point of view.
The external point of view may interpret this as part of the discussion
about hunger and poverty and sharing and religious good deeds. But I don’t
think we should see this act as itself intending to express some things,
intending to feed someone. It may be viewed as expressing something.
Therefore, I think there are all sorts of situations where we could limit
this. So, for example, the person who is providing the folding chairs for the
wedding, even if they’re claiming that they are expressing or not expressing
something, I’m going to rule them out.
Prof. Erica Goldberg, University of Dayton School of Law: Yes, I would
just add to that, that Jack Phillips himself said he was, and his actions are
conclusive that, he’s happy to serve all sorts of baked goods, and that might
not be satisfying to you. But in terms of the actual service, he just doesn’t
want to serve particular cakes that he bakes with a particular expressive
meaning.
I also think there are decent limiting principles here, and if I could just
say to Leslie, you had said that if we take out the dignitary harm there’s no
real compelling interest, but when there is no expression of issues, the state
does not need a compelling interest anymore, right? The state only needs a
rational basis.
Therefore, I feel like most of the civil rights laws will be totally intact
unless we have somebody who can make an actual plausible claim of
6

491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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expression at issue, like the folding chairs guy has no claim unless they are
custom-made folding chairs, but that would be upsetting.
Prof. Leslie Kendrick, University of Virginia School of Law: I agree with
you that I think that this cannot turn on whether people write on the cake, or
do not write on the cake, or make it special, or do not make it special.
However, I think on the offensiveness argument, I think the way the argument
is framed is to isolate the way in which you conduct the denial of service,
generates offense in the person who is denied service, right?
That’s the offensiveness, and the expression there does not have
anything to do with the cake. It is the denial of service that is expressing a
certain view that creates offense in the person who is denied service. That
seems to me to be a form of “expression” that is present in every single
application of civil rights law and in all the other types of laws that I was
talking about.

